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recently experienceddifficulties in achieving moneygrowth stabilityand money
supply independence.Based on the buffer—stockview of
money—holding as wellas the creditmarket approach to the
money supply, this
paper suggests thatthe problemshave arisen from theBank of Canadas
use of an interest
rate controlmechanism. The paper
argues that: (1) The
short—run behaviorof Canadian
money growth is influencedby demand shiftsin the Canadian
credit market.(2) Movements in U.S.
interest ratesrelative to the
controlled Canadian interest ratesare a key source
of these shifts.
The paperpresents evi- dence on Canadian
money supply and demand
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I.Introduction
After the breakdown of the BrettonWoods system and the adoption of
floating exchange rates by the major industrialcountries in March 1973, it
was widely believed that the newexchange system would allow each of these
countries to insulate its money
supply from foreign influences. The view
that monetary independence wasattainable may have encouragedsome of the
countries during the l970s topursue a policy of monetary targeting ——
establishinga preannounced target growth rate,or band of growth rates, of
some monetary aggregate.
Experience in the decade since floatingexchange rates were adopted
suggests that independence of nationalmoney supplies has not been
achieved.' Moreover,a number of countries that adoptedsome form of mone-
tary targeting have had considerable
difficulties, especially in recent
years, in achieving their targets.2
In this paper we consider thecase of Canada whose experience under
floating exchange rates provides anexample of unanticipated monetary
interdependence and disappointing performancein monetary growthtargeting.
Canada sought independence from theUnited States, even before thecollapse
of the Bretton Woods
system, by allowing the exchange rate to float
beginning May 1970. In November 1975 theBank of Canada announced a
of South Carolina and NationalBureau of Economic Research;
Carleton University; National Bureauof Economic Research.—2—
policy of setting a specific target rangefor the rate of growth of
In late 1979 ——aboutthe time U.S.interestrates began to exhibit
increased variability ——nadianmoney growth began to fluctuatesharply
relative to its behavior in the precedingfew years (see figure la). Since
late 1979, moreover, a pronounced positive
relationship has existed between
Canadian money growth and U.S. short—terminterest rates (see figurelb).4
By late 1982, the problem of monetary
control seemed so acute to the Bank
of Canada that it abandoned money growth targets(see also figure ib, which
shows the behavior of the money stockrelative to the target level).
Another feature of the Canadian experienceis that the regression for the
short—run demand for ——ofthe type used by the Bank of Canada ——
exhibitsexceptionally large residuals since1979 that appear to resemble
deviations of money growth from the target ratesof growth (compare figures
Ia and ic).
The Bank of Canada, like many central banks,has always used short—term
interest rates as its principal mechanismin executing monetary policy.
According to the conventional view of interestrate control that appears to
underlie the Bank's approach, the money stockwould be determined by money
demand, which the Bank can influence by settingan appropriate interest
rate. This view suggests two explanationsof the erratic behavior of the
Canadian money supply. ie explanation
links the behavior to the Bank's
exchange rate policy. Concernwithavoiding exchange rate fluctuations
leads the Bank to respond to movements in U.S.interest rates in setting
the Canadian interest rate. Thus largefluctuations in U.S. interest
rates since latei979 could have brought about variability in Canadian
money growth tbrhughtheirpositive effect on Canadian interest rates—3--
(through an interest rate policy reaction function) and then a negative
effect on the money stock (through the money demand function).However, a
problem with this explanation is that it implies a negative association
between U.S. interest rates and Canadian money growth rather than the
observed positive association.
A second explanation of the behavior of Canadianmoney growth —--one
that the Bank of Canada itself has emphasized ——isthat the demand for
6 N1 in Canada has become less stable since 1979. Onereasonsuggested for
the instability during this period is the impact of financial innovations,
possibly induced by high interest rates.7 The instability in money demand
could account for both large residuals in the demand equation as wellas
large fluctuations in money growth. However, this explanation does not
account for the positive correlation between Canadian money growth and U.S.
interest rates.
This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the triple incidence
of money growth variability, the apparent money demand instability in
Canada, and the positive dependence of Canadian money growth on U.S.
interest rates. Ourexplanationis related to two strands in the
literature: (1) Brunner and Meltzer's credit market approach to themoney
supply process (19Th); and (2) the buffer stock view of money recently
emphasized by Laidler (1984).8 We argue that movements in U.S. interest
rates cause shifts i-n the demand for domestic credit in Canada which, under
interest rate control -of the money supply process, produce changes in
Canadian money growth. Changes in U.S. interest rates through this mecha-
nism have a positive effect on Canadian money supply growth, providinga
channel for monetary interdependence additional to the one arising from the—4—
Bank of Canada's exchange rate management policy. According to the buffer
stock view, money supply disturbances automatically affect money demand in
the short run and thus these shocks appear as shifts of the money demand
function.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section II we discuss the Bank
of Canada's approach to the determination of money growth under interest
rate control. According to this approach, the money stock can deviate from
its target value either because of unexpected changes in the demand for
money or because the Bank occasionally places greater importance onother
objectives, such as the exchange rate. Although both factors have been
important sources of divergence of the money stock from its target values,
our interpretation of the first factor differs from that of the Bank. In
section III we present a framework of money growth under interest rate
control that supplants the Bank's approach. We first develop a money
supply process which highlights the role of the credit market and its sen-
sitivity to foreign shocks as well as the Bank of Canada's intervention in
the exchange market. We then discuss interaction between the money supply
and money demand functions by incorporating the determinants of the money
supply process into the short—run mechanism by which actual money balances
adjust to desired money balances. Section IV presents evidence consistent
with the money supply process we describe and supports the view that money
supply disturbances, such as those produced by variability in foreign
interest rates, exert an important influence on the short—run demand for
money function. Section V summarizes the conclusions and implications of
the paper.—5—
II. Money Growth Under Interest Rate Control: The Bank of Canada's Approach
The Bank's approach is based on the conventional view that interest rate
control implies a money supply function which is perfectly interest elastic
at the fixed interest rate, and that the stock of money is determined where
the money demand function intersects the elastic supply function.9
According to this view, knowledge of the demand for money can he used to
manipulate the interest rate in order to determine the behavior of the money
stock. In this approach, the rate of money growth would deviate from the
desired rate only to the extent that changes in money demand were unan-
ticipated at the time the rate of interest was set. If the unanticipated
changes are not large, interest rate control would be a viable method for
money growth targeting in the sense that it would be technically feasible
to keep money growth close to the target path. We discuss below how such a
policy would he implemented and then examine to what extent the Bank has
followed this policy.
An essential ingredient in the Bank's approach is an econometric esti-
mate of the demand for money. Most of the empirical work on demand for Ml
in Canada uses an equation which combines a long—run demand function with
a real partial adjustment mechanism following Chow (1966). A simple but




a1+a2r+ u, a1> a2 < 0, (1)
where m*, yandrrepresent logarithms of thedesiredreal stock of money,
realincome,and the shortterminterest rate, respectively;u isthe—6—
error term. Adding the Chow mechanism, we have
=
Xm
+ (1 -X)ni1, 0< A < 1, (2)
where m is the logarithm of the actual real stock of money.




= — +A(a0 + a1
+ a2r + Ut —mti),
(3)
where N and P are the logarithms of the nominal money stock and the price
level.
Let Mt represent the logarithm of the mid—value of the target money
stock announced for periodt.'1 Letr be the interest ratethat would
make the expected value of Mt equal to M, According to the money demand
function (3), r would satisfy
— = — + + a1+ a2 + - (4)
where P,'and represent the forecasts of.P, y, and u, available to
the Bank in period t.
When the Bank of Canada announced its targeting policy in 1975, it was
assumed initially that the Bank would attempt to achieve its target by
setting the interest rate at r in eachperiod.'2 The Bank, however,
made it clear later that money growth targets were not its sole concern and
that it would be influenced by other considerations in determining the
interest rate.'3 e special concern of the Bank has been preventing
large noverients in the exchange rate. For this reason the Bank may have
been reacting to the U.S. interest rate to avoid letting a substantial dif——7—
ferentialdevelop between U.S.andCanadian interest rates.'4
To explore the Bank of Canada interest rate reaction function, we con-
sider the following model:
r = +(1
—0)r 0< 0< 1, (5)
—ri
=p(r*—ri)
+ Xtll + Vt, 0 < ii K 1. (6)
where r* is the "desired" rate of interest in the long run, rus the U.S.
interestrate. X a vector representing other oblectives (II a corresponding
vector of coefficients) and v an error term. The above model allows for
the possibility that the desired long—run rate may equal(0 =1),rus
(0=0),or a weighted average of the two rates. Moreover, the model per-
mitsthe interest rate to be adjusted gradually towards the desired rate
(p K 1) and for other objectives (included in X) to play a role in the
short—run determination of the interest rate.
To estimate the model, we developed a measure of r as follows.
First, the demand function for Canadian M1, based on (1) and (2), was esti-
mated for the floating exchange rate period, 1970111—19831, using quarterly
data; OLSQ estimates of the function are presented in row 1 of Table 1.
(As significant serial correlation of the error term is not indicated,
the Cochrane—Orcutt adjustment is not used.) Next, values of —
andywere generated from forecasting equations, developed according to a
procedure suggested by Mishkin(1983).16Then r was calculated according
to(4).
Makinguseof theabove measure of r, we estinated an int:erest—
rate reaction function for the Bank of Canada, based on (5) and (6). The
function was estimated for the floating exchange rate period 1970111—19831,17 using a dummy variable to distinguish between subperiods with
and without the targeting policy. Three variables ——theexpected rate
of inflation, the expected rate of unemployment, and the (actual) rate
of exchange rate appreciation ——wereconsidered as possible candidates to
represent the setX.'8 None of these variables proved to be signifi-
cant.19 After dropping these variables from the reaction function, the
regression estimates are as follows:
r —r1




p =.14,R2 =.79,DW =2.13,SEE =.0074, (7)
(1.92)
where D is a dummy variable for the targeting period (equal to 1 for
1975111—1982111, equal to zero in the remaining period)., and t—values are
shown below the coefficients.
The regression equation shows that although r has exerted some influence
on the Canadian interest rate, the effect of the U.S. interest rate has
been much stronger.2° The magnitude of the effect of the U.S. interest
rate in the targeting period, moreover, has been less than but not signifi-
cantly different from its effect in the nontarget period. The evidence
suggests that the targeting policy had only a marginal influence on the
Bank of Canada's reaction function.21
The reluctance of the Bank of Canada to follow a pure targeting
strategy of setting r =rcould account for the divergence of from Mt.
Rowever, even if r had been set exactly equal to r in each period, the money
stock could still have diverged from its target value because of errors in—9—
forecasting inflation and output, and unforeseen shifts in money demand.
To examine the relative importance of these factors, we subtracted (4) from
(3) and let u0 (based on the absence of serial correlation in our
estimates of money demand) to get
— = —) +Xa1(y—y)+X2(r—r)
+Xu. (8)
Using our estimate of and y from the forecasting equations, of




itis possible to decompose the variance of Mt —Mtinto variances
and covariances of the terms on the right—hand side of the equation. For
the period 1975111—1982111 during which the targeting policy was in force,
we find that the sum of the first two terms accounted for only 6.8 percent
of the variance of —
Nt,while the third term was responsible for 46.0
and the last term for 59.5 percent of the variance.22 (The sum of the
covariance terms was thus equal to —12.3 percent of the variance.)
According to these estimates, the deviation of r from r played an important
role in causing the divergence of M from Mt. However, money demand resi-
duals were also a major source of the divergence. This evidence would
appear to support the Bank of Canada's explanation that its difficulties
with controlling money growth have arisen from money demand instability.
We do not agree with this explanation. Wepresent in thenext section
a framework alternative to the onetheBank has adopted that we believe is a
more accurate analysis of the dynamicsofinterest rate control of money
growth. Inthefo].Iowing section we present aninterpretationof the
results from the.firstregression in Table 1 that suggests that the
observedresiduals in the money demand regression reflect an inadeuacy in— 10—
theconventional specification of the short—run adjustment mechanism rather
than instability in the long run demand for money.
III. Money Supply and Demand Under Interest Rate Control:
An Alternative View
In this section we first present a view of how the stock of money is
determined under interest rate control that differs from the Bank's view,
and then go on to discuss the interaction between money supply and demand.
Under interest rate control, the central bank attempts to fix the yield
on (a certain class of) government securities by being ready to absorb any
excess demand or supply at the fixed price. This policy amounts to
making the supply of central bank domestic credit (assets of the central
bank excluding international reserves) perfectly interest elastic. In
addition, interest rate control generally provides commercial banks free
access to reserves at a fixed interestrate.23 If banks can freely vary
their reserves, commercial bank credit (assets pf banks excluding bank
reserves) would also become perfectly interest elastic.24 In this case,
the entire banking sector could be viewed as willing to accommodate the
demand for domestic credit (defined as the sum Of commercial bank and
central hank domestic credit) by the nonbanking public at the fixed rate.
A change in the demand for domestic credit would then automatically produce
a change in the money supply as a result of the nonbanking public's tran-
sactions with the banking sector. A change in the demand for domestic cre-
dit, moreover, need not produce a matching change in money demand. Thus
if, according to the buffer stock approach, the money market does not clear
instantaneously, then the tock of money would not be demand—determined and
the conventional view would he undermined. The view we present below is— 11—
onein which the stock of money is determined largely by the demand for
domestic credit.25
The demand for domestic credit depends on the rates of return on alter—
native assets.26 If these alternatives are very good substitutes for
assets included in domestic credit, the demand for domestic credit would be
sensitive to changes in rates of return on the substitutes and thus not
likely to be very stable. Instability in the demand for domestic credit
for this reason may produce considerable volatility in money supply under
interest rate control.
For a country like Canada whose financial markets are well integrated
with U.S. markets, movements in the foreign rate relative to the controlled
domestic rate can trigger large changes in the demand for domestic credit.
To highlight the role of shifts between domestic and foreign securities,
consider a simple framework which abstracts from differences in securities
due to risk, term of maturity, and other characteristics. Assume that all
interest—bearing assets take the form of a riskless one period bond. Let r
and us represent the yields on domestic and U.S. bonds, respectively.
Also, letbe the expected rate of change in the exchange rate (the price
of U.s. dollars) so that rUS + 0 is the expected rate of return on the U.S.
bond (in terms of domestic currency). In this simple framework, domestic
credit (DC) would equal (for simplicity, we omit the time subscripts from
equations (9) through (13) below)
DC =B—B (9)
where B represents the total stock of domestic bonds and B° is the stock
held by the nonbank public.—12—
As the money supply (MS) uld equal the sum of domestic credit and inter-
national reserves (IR), we can express the rate of money growth as27
LMS/MS =DC/MS+ iIR/MS. (10)
Under interest rate control, ADC would equal the change in the demand for
domestic credit. According to (9), moreover, the change in domestic credit
would equal the difference between the change in the total supply of
domestic bonds (SB) and that in the demand by the nonbank public (LB11).
While the flow of public and private borrowing would determine AB, shifts
between domestic bonds and other assets, especially foreign bonds, would
n
affect AB
We present below a simple relationship explaining the change in
domestic credit (divided by the money stock). Our purpose is to highlight
the sensitivity of domestic credit to rates of return on domestic and
foreign bonds. We expect an increase in rUS +to cause a shift from
domestic to foreign bonds and induce the sale of domestic bonds to the
banking sector by the nonbank public and thus lead to a decrease in B11.
Similarly, an increase in r would be expected to cause an increase in B11.
Assuming that AB1 dominates the behavior of ADC, we posit the following
relationship:
ADC/MS = +'S (rlS + a) + 62r + w1 , (11)
61 > ,6< 0,
where w1 is an error term representing the influence of other factors.28
Changes in international reserves (divided by the money stock) also
represent another source of money growth. These changes would arise
because ofexchange—marketintervention by the Bank of Canada. The primary— 13—
objectiveof the Bank's intervention activity appears to be to smooth move-
ments in the exchange rate.29 Thus, we expect changes in international
reserves to be inversely related to changes in the exchange rate. The
amount of exchange market intervention may also depend on other objectives
such as inflation or unemployment. As discussed above, movements in
rUS + relative to r would induce shifts between domestic and foreign
bonds and thus put pressure on the exchange rate to move. The change in
the exchange rate due to this source may be perceived by the Bank to be
temporary, since according to the Bank's interest rate reaction function, r
would he adjusted to rus almost completely in the long run. The Bank
therefore may intervene in the exchange market in response to movements in
rUS +cand r (in addition to its response to the actual exchange rate
change).
We thus consider an intervention function of the following form:
lR/MS = + (rUS + o) + 2r + X2 + w2, (12)
< '2>
where X is a vector (identical with that in the interest—rate reaction
function (6)) representing other objective variables including the rate of
change of the exchange rate, 2 a vector of coefficients, and w2 the error
term in the relationship. Adding (11) and (12), we get the following
'money supply" function:— 14-





+ < 0, (13)
where w =
w1+ w2. Note that rUS +exerts a positive effect on money
growth through the domestic credit function, but a negative effect through
the intervention function. On the other hand, r would exert a negative
effect on money growth through the domestic credit function and a positive
effect through the intervention function. Under a managed float, we would
expect the net effect of r'5 + c to be positive, while that of r to be
negative, so that K1 would be positive and K2 negative. To explain these
signs, consider, for instance, an increase in rUS that causes an excess
supply of domestic bonds and a matching excess demand for foreign bonds.3°
Under interest rate control, the excess supply of domestic bonds would be
fully accommodated and lead to an equal increase in DC. The extra demand
for foreign exchange (arising from the excess demand for foreign bonds)
would also equal the change in DC, but under a managed float would not be
fully accommodated. In this case, the change in IR would be less (in abso—
lute value) than the change in DC and thus intervention would provide a
partial offset to the effect of domestic credit.
We now consider the interaction between the foregoing money supply
function and the demand for money function discussed earlier. According to
the buffer stock view, excess money balances would be run down gradually
over time. On an individual level, one reason for the slow adjustment may
be that in the presence of uncertainty, it is economical to take some time
to search for information relevant to portfolio and spending decisions.31
However, while individuals can reduce their money balances, the community— 15—
asa whole cannot. The aggregate demand for money can adjust but the
adjustment may be slow if the arguments of the demand for money change
sluggishly. Although inertia in the price level and, to a lesser extent,
in output is generally recognized, the critics of the buffer stock view
argue that the interest rate would adjust rapidly to clear the money
market. Under interest rate control, however, even this variable is tem-
porarily fixed and cannot be relied on to eliminate excess money balances
32
rapidly.
Although the conventional specification of short—run money demand
includes a partial adjustment mechanism, the mechanism does not adequately
represent the buffer stock view, The basic problem is that while the par-
tial adjustment mechanism incorporates gradual adjustment in the desired
real stock of money to changes in the arguments of money demand, it does
33
not allow for such adjustment in response to changes in money supply.
Carr and Darby (1981) have suggested that money supply shocks
(unanticipated money) should be included in the partial adjustment mecha-
nism. One problem with that approach, however, is that even some antici-
pated money may be held temporarily if the price level does not adjust
fully to anticipated changes. Another issue is that unanticipated money
would be correlated with the residual in money demand, which would make it
difficult to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the effect of
money supplyshocks.34
As an alternative approach, we introduce the determinants of the money
supply function (13) into the partial adjustment mechanism and rewrite this
mechanism as:— 16—
= Xmt*+ (1 —X)mti+ 1(r + o) + 2 r + z,
> ' <0, (14)
where z is an error term which we expect to be correlated with w, the error
term in the money supply function. Note that has the same sign as
K1 and 2 the same sign as K2.5
To examine the implications of the modified partial adjustment mecha-
nism for the short—term demand for money, we combine (14) with (1) and get
=+'y + 12r + 13(r + a) + 14mi + e,
(15)
Ii =1'2 = +2' 13 =],14
1 —Ae =Xu+ z.
As (15) shows, the term e would now reflect the error term in the demand
for money as well as that in the supply function.36 Moreover, the effect
of r in (15) represents its influence through both the demand and supply
functions. Finally, one interesting testable implication of (15) is that
(rUS + o) would exert a positive effect on
The portfolio balance approach to the demand for money in an open eco-
nomy suggests that the variables rS and 0 may also influence the desired
stock of real balances. However, as explained below, the direction of the
possible effect of rUS and o via the demand for money would be opposite to
that via the supply side. The long—run demand for money, according to the
open—economy portfolio balance approach, can be written as (see Cuddington
1983):
a0 + + a2r + a3(r + o) + a4c +u,
a1 > °' a2 < 0, a3 0, a4 ( 0. (16)
In(16), a3would be negative if foreign bonds and domestic money are gross— 17—
substitutesand equal zero if there is no direct substitution between these
assets. Similarly, a4 would be negative if currency substitution is pre-
sent and equal zero otherwise. Now, if we combine (14) with (16), we can











wherey, I2 14 and e are the same as in (15). Thus, estmation of the short—
short—run money demand function would provide a clear—cut test of the pre-
sence of rUS and a on the supply side, regardless of whether the true form
of the function is given by (15) or (17). If =0,13 =0in (15) while
37
130 and 0, according to (17).
IV.EmpiricalEvidence on the Money Supply Process and the Short—Run
Demand for Money
In this section we present evidence on supply functions explaining
money growth and its components, and on the short—run demand for money
incorporating the modified partial adjustment mechanism.
Each equation is initially estimated, using OLS. To avoid simultaneous
equation bias, the key equations are reestimated using a two—stage least
squares procedure. The instruments used in this procedure were based on
the model of the Bank's reaction function discussed in section II above.
One problem with estimating both the supply and demand functions for
money is thatnoreliable measure of a is available. As a proxy for a, we
used f—s where f and s denote, respectively, the logarithms of forward
andspotexchange rates. As is well recognized, this rieasurewould he
subject to error in the presence of a risk premium. Thus, when using this— 18—
measure,the coefficient of a was not constrained to be equal to that of
r.38 other potential difficulty with the use of f—salong th r and
rUS is that interest rate arbitrage would lead to a high degree of multi—
collinearity among these variables. This problem, however, was not severe
in the data set we used. The simple correlation between r and (rUS +f—s)
was .91, and thus not very close to a perfect linear relationship.39
Table 2 presents the supply side regressions for the flexible exchange
rate period 1970111—19831. Row 1 of the table shows OLS estimates of the
domestic credit equation (11). All variables in this equation are highly
significant and have the expected signs. In estimating the intervention
function, we first tried a conventional form in which AIR/MS depends only
on the X variables, representing the expected rate of inflation, the rate of
change in the spot exchange rate and the expected unemploent rate.4°
Of these only the first two variables, AP and As, were significant, and
the estimated equation including these variables is shown in row 3 of the
table. Then we estimated an extended intervention function according to
us 41 (12), which also includes r ,r,and f—s. As shown in row 4 of the
table, the additional variables are significant and have signs opposite to
those in the domestic credit equation.
To facilitate a comparisonbetween the international reserve and the
domestic credit equations, we also introduce AP and As into the latter
equation in row 2 of the table. As the estimates show, although these
additional variables are insignificant, their effect on ADC/MS is of the
opposite sign and about the same magnitude as that on AIR/MS. Comparing
rows 2 and 4, it is also clear that the coefficients of the three
variables, r, rus, and f—s are all larger, in terms of their absolute— 19—
values,in the domestic credit than in the international reserve equation.
The results confirm the hypothesis that under a managed float, the effects
of r, rUS, and f—s operating through the domestic credit function would
dominate the money supply process.
The estimates of the money growth equation with the same variables as
in rows 2 and 4 are shown in row 6 of the table. As discussed above, the
net effect of LP and s on money growth is close to zero. The money growth
equation excluding these variables is showninrow 5. As r and f—s are
endogenous variables, we also estimate this equation using two—stage least
squares and present the estimates in row 7 of the table. The instrumental
variables used to obtain these estimates represent the variables entering
the Canadian interest rate reaction function (ri, rUS, ,andD) and the
lagged value of f—s.42The effect of r and rus now becomes larger (in
absolute value) and remains significant. The effect of f—s, however, is
not significant. This result may reflect the measurement error problem
mentioned above.
Next we examine the role of the supply side factors in the demand for
mtmey.Intable 1 we present estimates of the short—run money demand
equation of the form (15) in rows 2 and 3, using the ordinary least squares
andtwo—stageleast squares procedures, respectively. As y represents an
additional endogenous variable in the money demand relationship, the list
of instrumental variables now includes additional variables relevant to
predicting y. The additional variables represent yUS (U.S. output measured
in logarithms) as well as the lagged values of certain Canadian variables
—43 used in the forecasting equation deveioped in section II to measure r.
The results reported in table 1 support the view that supply—side con—20 —
siderationsmatter in the adjustment mechanism. As the results show,
rUS exerts a positive and significant effect on the real stock ofmoney.
This evidence is inconsistent with the conventional closed—economy for-
mulation in which r'5 would be absent from the money demand function. It
is also inconsistent with the conventional open—economy variant where
r would have a negative effect on the demand for money. The f—s variable
which did not survive the two—stage money supply regression was also found
not significant in the two—stage money demand regression. Finally, it is
interesting to note that the introduction of rUS in the money demand
regression increases the absolute value of the coefficient of r. In the
two—stage regression, this coefficient is equal to —1.33. In the absence
of supply side factors in the adjustment mechanism =2
=0),such a
value would imply a long—run interest elasticity equal to —1.23 (at the
average value of the interest rate over the the given period).44 This
estimate of the long—run elasticity would appear to be too large in rela-
tion to previous estimates.45 If the modified adjustment mechanism is
used, however, the coefficient of r would also include the supply side
effect (recall 12 = + and the implied long—run interest elasticity
could be considerably lower.
V. Conclusions and Implications
Three conclusions emerge from the study of the Bank of Canada's use
of an interest rate control procedure to determine monetary growth. The
first conclusion is that under the interest rate procedure, for an open
economy such as Canada, foreign shocks cause disturbances to the money
supply through the domestic credit market. Canada's use of an interest— 21-
rateas its policy instrument for controlling money growth thus leads to a
hitherto unrecognized channel of interdependence. When interest rates rise
in the United States, the Canadian nonbank public will switch from domestic
to foreign bonds. Under interest rate control, the authorities and the
banking sector will buy all domestic bonds that are offered by the public,
with expansionary effects on money growth. This effect represents a chan-
nel that is additional to the Bank of Canada's direct response to changes
in U.S. interest rates through a domestic interest rate reaction function
——awell understood channel of interdependence.
A second conclusion is that variability in money growth attributable to
foreign shocks can easily be misinterpreted as instability in the demand
for money. The reason for the misinterpretation is that the conventional
specification of the short—run mechanism by which actual real money balan-
ces adjust to desired real money balances is inadequate. We argue in the
paper that money supply disturbances should be included in the adjustment
mechanism, and that these disturbances could account for apparent shifts in
the demand for money.
A final conclusion is that use of an interest rate as the policy
instrument is a mechanism that may be incompatible with the objective of
stable money growth. The basic problem is that the demand function in the
credit market is likely to be very sensitive to the differential between
the rate the authorities set and the rate of return on close substitutes.
Movements in rates of return on substitutes relative to the controlled
interest rate would shift the demand function for credit and change the
money stock. In an open economy, foreign securities are a close substitute
for domestic credit and changes in rates of return on foreign assets are an— 22—
importantsource of monetary variability.
The foregoing considerations suggest that a policy of money growth
targeting through the use of an interest rate control procedure is doomed
to failure even if there is no conflict with other objectives. Even if the
central bank takes into account the role of domestic credit in the deter-
mination of money growth, large movements in money growth could still occur
because of large unanticipated changes in the demand for domestic credit in
response to changes in the rate of return on alternative assets.
This paper implies that the behavior of money growth would be different
under reserve control. Suppose that the Bank's money supply procedure were
based on reserve control. It would provide the banks the reserves that
would be adequate to support the growth rate of the money supply that it
deemed appropriate. If it ignored the movements in U.S. interest rates,
Canadian nationals might still choose to switch from domestic to foreign
bonds with initially higher U.S. interest rates, but the nonbank public
would not find ready buyers in the banking sector for their domestic bonds.
The yields on domestic bonds would therefore rise to match the U.S.
interest rate, and money supply growth would be unaffected.
Again, under reserve control, the effect of exchange rate management on
the money supply could be completely sterilized, but the Canadian interest
rate would have to move to clear the credit market.46 In those circumstan-
ces, there would be no link between U.S. interest rates and Canadian money
growth. With exchange market intervention not fully sterilized, reserve
control would be weakened.
All things considered, in our judgment if the objective of the Canadian
monetary authorities is to achieve control of the money supply process, the— 23—
interestrate procedure is a self—defeating means. For an open economy,
that procedure will heighten interdependence.— 24—
APPENDIX:Data and Sources
D: A dummy variable equal to 1 for the money targeting period
1975111—1982111, and zero for the remaining period.
DC: Domestic credit, billions of Canadian dollars, defined as MS—IR.
Natural logarithm of the forward Canadian dollar exchange rate,
average of monthly figures. Source: IFS Financial Statistics.
IR: Total reserves minus gold, determined as the product of the IFS
series expressed in U.S. dollars with the Canadian spot dollar
exchange rate. Billions of Canadian dollars, average of monthly
figures. Source: IFS Financial Statistics.
NS: Money supply Ml, billions of Canadian dollars, seasonally adjusted.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
M Natural logarithm of MS.
N Natural logarithm of the mid—value of the target money stock calcu-
lated according to the procedure outlined in note 11, converting
the Bank's announcements to a quarterly basis. Source: Bank of
Canada Review, various issues, for the announcement of money growth
targets.
Natural logarithm of real cash balances, defined as N—P.
P: Natural logarithm of the Canadian Implicit Price Deflator (1971
base). Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
r: Short—term Canadian interest rate, average of monthly figures.
Morgan—Guaranty representative money market rates. Source: Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
us
r : idem for the U.S.— 25—
s: Natural logarithm of the spot Canadian dollar exchange rate.
Average of monthly figures. Source: IFS Financial Statistics.
UN: Canadian unemployment rate. Source: OECD Main Economic
Indicators.
y: Natural logarithm of Real Gross National Product (billions of
Canadian dollars), seasonally adjusted. Source: Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.— 26—
Footnotes
'According to DeGrauwe and Fratianni (1984, Table 5), for example,
correlations of the average annual growth rates of Ml of 7 major countries
increased in 1971—81 compared to 1960—70. Also see McKinnon (1982, 1984),
and Dornbusch and Fischer (1984).
2Some examples are Canada, Germany and the U.K. See Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (1983), pp. 102—4, 22—4, 54—9.
3me Bank of Canada announced: "It would not seem appropriate for the
time being to have an underlying rate of monetary growth below 10 per cent
per year, but that on the other hand, an underlying rate of 15 per cent
would be too high" (statement by Governor Bouey in testimony before the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs,
November 6, 1975). Courchene (1977), p. 27. Subsequent announcements gra-
dually lowered the average target rate to 6% by February 1981. The target
range was also narrowed from 5 to 4 percentage points.
4The simple correlation of quarterly Canadian M1 money growth with U.S.
short—term interest rates is .58 for 19791V to 19831.
5The standard deviation of the quarterly rate of change of the U.S.
3—month T—bfll rate increased from .012 1970111 —1979111to .029 19791V —
19831.In October 1979, the Federal Reserve System changed its monetary
control variable, substituting nonborrowed reserves for the Federal funds
rate. It is widely believed that this change in the monetary control
variable is responsible for wider variability in both U.S. money growth and
interest rates. (See Friedman (1984), Mascaro and Meltzer (1983).
6See, for instance the Governor's Remarks (Bank of Canada Review,— 27
September 1982):
"Notwithstanding the contribution of monetary targeting in getting
monetary policy to a better track, practical problems have emerged in
Canada, and I expect other countries as well, which have reduced the use-
fulness of these targets as policy guides .Perhaps the most trouble-
some problem in Canada is that the relationship between our target monetary
aggregate——N1—--and the level of spending has not turned out to be as stable
s itppearc.din fh micl—1970's"
7See e.g. Lucas (1984).
8See Carr and Darby (1981) for a related shock—absorber view of money.
See also Judd and Scadding (1981) and White (1981).
9See, for instance, White (1979) for such an interpretation.
'°See, for instance, Clinton (1973), Gregory and Mackinnon (1980),
Poloz (1980), Bordo and Choudhri (1982).
The Bank actually announced target rates of growth measured with refer-
ence to a specified base period. it is possible, however, to calculate
as follows: Mt =Mt_n÷ gn, where M_ is the logarithm of the money
stock in the base period t —nand g is the mid value of the announced
target range.
'2See Parkin (1981). Also see Courchene's (1979) discussion of the
Bank's approach.
'3According to the Bank (1982a, p. 27), "The Bank thus never regarded
its Ml target system as some sort of automatic pilot for monetary policy.
In the short run it was something to be taken into account along with other
considerations."28 —
14Sincethe Bank of Canada believes that it "can exert a substantial
degree of influence over interest rates at the short end of the maturity
spectrum" (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1983, P. 100), in our empiri-
cal work we use a representative short—term interest rate ——thesime rate
that we use in the demand for money regressions below. Representative
short—term rates include the Treasury bill rate, the rate on 90—day finance
company paper, and the call money rate.
'5To test the possibility that postal strikes during this period had a
significant impact on the demand for money, we reestimated the demand for
money regressions with dummy variables for major postal strikes. Although
some postal strike dummies were significant, they did not affect the
results much. We have omitted them from the regression equations shown in
the table to simplify the presentation.
'61n the forecasting equations, we used first differences of quarterly P
and y. LP and iy were both regressed on their own four lagged values as
well as four lagged values of a number of Canadian macro variables. In
addition to LiP and Liy, we included Lir, LiM, Lis and LiU, where s is the
logarithm of the spot exchange rate and U the unemployment rate. The four
lagged values of these variables were retained in the forecasting equation
only if they were jointly significant at the 5% level. (The forecasting
equation for Liy included lagged values of tiM and AU in addition to own
lagged values. The equation for LiP, however, did not retain any variable
exceptown lagged values.) The predicted value of y is defined as
plus the predicted value of Ay.
'7We used quarterly data because the estimates of the money demand func—— 29—
tiondiscussed above are quarterly.
18We assume that while the exchange rate is observed immediately, the
information on the rates of inflation and unemployment becomes available to
the Bank with a lag. The expected rates of inflation and unemployment,
however, were estimated according to the procedure discussed in note 16
which assumes a one quarter information lag. As the actual information lag
may have been shorter, we also introduced unexpected rates of these
variables in the regression but found these to be insignificant.
-9Expected changes in the unemployment rate as well as the inflation
rate were also tried but turned Out to be insignificant.
200ur measure of r would, of course, not be exactly the same as the r
that the Bank may have utilized. In some respects, we may have assumed
that too little information was available to the Bank, but in other
respects, too much. Information lags, on the one hand, may be considerably
less than one quarter, but on the other hand, the estimates of money demand that
we used are based on the data for the whole period. It is also possible that
rather than basing r on r, the Bank may have followed a policy simply of
reacting to the last—period deviation of the money stock from its target
value (see Courchene 1979). In an alternative version of the reaction
function, we replaced (r —ri)by (Mi —Mtl)
but found that the
latter target variable produced similar results.
21See also Gregory and Reynauld (1985) who reach similar conclusons
using a different form of the reaction function.
22The relative importance of themoneydemand residual in explaining the
deviation of from is very similar in the period since late 1979. For— 30—
theperiod 19791V to 1982111, the variance of Xu accounts for 58% of the
total variance of M —Mtas compared to 44% for the third term and 8% for
the sum of the first two terms in (8).
231n the Canadian system, less emphasis is placed on open market opera-
tions than in the United States. The Bank of Canada sets Bank Rate at
which recognized money market dealers ——asin the United Kingdom ——can
borrow from the central bank. The Bank can alter bank reserves by the use
of government deposit transfers, augmenting reserves by transfers of the
deposits to chartered banks, diminishing reserves by transfers of the depo-
sits to the Bank. With fewer than a dozen chartered banks, the Bank can
also rely on moral suasion. Chartered banks are subject to a fixed 12%
primary reserve ratio on demand Canadian dollar liabilities and 4% on
savings deposits. A secondary reserve ratio ——theratio of the sum of
Treasury bills, call loans, and cash in excess of the primary reserve
requirement to total Canadian dollar liabilities ——towhich the chartered
banks are subject, may be varied by the Bank from 0% to 12%. If actual
reserves of the chartered banks fell short of the reserves provided by the
Bank, the chartered banks could reduce their call loans and force the money
market dealers to borrow from the Bank. The chartered banks could also buy
Treasury bills in the open market to meet any secondary reserve deficiency.
See Courchene (1976, pp. 11—31).
24The term commercial bank credit is sometimes used to refer to bank
loans. Here we do not emphasize the distinction between bank loans and
other earning assets of commercial banks.
25See Laidler (1980) who refers to the conventional view as the money—
market view and the alternative view as the credit—market view.— 31—
26Alternativeassets refer to financial assets other than those included
in the balance sheets of the consolidated banking sector. These alter-
natives would include equities and would represent foreign as well as
domestic assets.
271n the empirical work discussed below, MS is defined as narrow money.
Tittie deposits are thus being aggregated with other interest—bearing assets.
28As our main concern is with the role of r and rUS + a in the domestic
credit function, we did not explore, in our empirical estimation of (11)
below, the possible influence of other variables such as an index of
wealth. We did, however, consider the possibility that if the adjustment
of actual 'to the desired stock of domestic credit is completed in each
period, the change in the demand for domestic credit may depend on first
differences rather than levels of the rates of return. We tried a domestic
credit function with L(r'5 + a) and tr as the arguments, but found that
this variant did not perform as well as (11) above.
29See Canada. Department of Finance (1982), and Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (1983, p. 103), for a discussion of the Bank of Canada's reaction
to movements in the Canadian exchange rate relative to the U.S.dollar.
30Weexcludefrom this simple example a shift from domestic money or
equities into foreign bonds.
3'It has been argued that while there may be significant transactions
costs of switching from broad money to other assets, these costs are low
for shifts between narrow money and time deposits. See, for example,
Coodfriend (1984).
32As Laidler (1984) suggested, even if the interest rate is flexible, it— 32—
couldclear the credit market but need not imply clearing of the money
market, if some other market, such as the capital goods market, does not
clear rapidly and is therefore characterized by excess demand or supply.
33An alternative interpretation of the partial adjustment mechanism,
suggested by Goodfriend (1984), is that the mechanism could represent
errors in the measurement of the arguments in the demand for money.
34See McKinnon and Milbourne (1984).
crrtiv P- I I - A disriissd in
the next section, X variables in (13) did not turn out to be significant
and thus we have not included them in (14).
36Note that the residuals in the regression equation in row 1 of table 1
would now represent not only e but also the effect of the omitted term
usr +c.
37A positive effect of rS onm would also be implied by currency—
substitution models which assume r_rS to be a measure of .Forinstance,
in the special case of perfect interest arbitrage and zero risk premium, r—
r'8 would exactly equal a. Substituting 0 =rru5in (17) and rearranging,
the coefficient of rUS would equal: —
Xct,which would be positive
with < 0. However, if there are departures from the above special case,
the currency—substitution model can be discriminated from the supply—side
effects by estimating the money demand function of the form (17), which
includes a as well as r and In this form, the coefficient of r'8 must
be negative or zero according to the currency—substitution model when the
supply—side effect is absent. Also see note 38 below.
38Note that if f—s is a poor proxy for a because of the presence of the— 33—
riskpremium, (r_rUS) uld also be a poor proxy for .Forinstance, let
f—s =ci+p,and r_rUS =f—s+c,where p is the risk premium and c represents.
departures from perfect interest rate arbitrage. It follows that r_rlS
a+p+c. As there is no reason to suspect a systematic negative association
between p and c, r_rUS in fact would provide a noisier signal on a than f—s.
39me implied departure from interest rate arbitrage may be due to tran-
sactions costs. There may also be measurement errors in that the reported
data for f and s may not represent the true transaction values.
40me expected values were estimated using the procedure discussed in
note 16. Because of the caveat discussed in note 18, unexpected rates of
inflation and unemployment were also considered as additional variables in
the regressions but these variables were not significant.
41me coefficients of the reaction function were stable betwen sub—
periods with and without the target policy, according to the F—test at the
5% level.
42The lagged value of f—s was significant in a regression of f—s on r
us and r
43The complete list of instrumental variables for this regression
includes r, r, D, (f) US and four lagged values of
and Lyt.
441n the semilog money demand function that we use, the long—run elasti-
city at r0 would equal a2 r0. From (15) (with 820), a2 = The
value of the interest elasticity in the text is calculated using estimates
of 12 and X fromregression3 intable1 and lettingr0.097 (the
averagevalue of r over the period).— 34—
45Previousstudies tend to find the long—run elasticity of money demand
(defined as a positive value) considerably less than one. See, for
example, Laidler (1977).
461t is interesting to note, however, that under interest rate control,
exchange rate management may not be inferior on grounds of money growth
variability, since in the absence of such a policy, the differential bet—
ween Canadian and U.S. interest rates might be greater leading to greater
monetary variability.— 35—
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The Canadian Short—Run Demand for Money, Quarterly Data,
197011119831
us
Constant y r r
1. .01 .06_53*
(.06) (1.69) (—4.79)
2. —.05 .08* —1.09 59*
(—.34) (2.15) (—4.85) (2.81)
3a —.12 .10* _1.33* .78*
I__71\ f•))\f_I. 7c1\() Qi\ kL.J-)Ikt.I7/ L.i/
Note: The dependent variable is m.
appendix for data and sources.
a Represents two—stage least squares
instrument variables.
f—smi R2 DW h SEE
.90* .947 2.24—.88 .0176
(24.04)
.23 .88* .955 2.20—.73 .0165
(1.66) (24.72)
.30 .87* .954 2.12—.45 .0168
11Q\ (' Y)\ 1._Ju/
* indicatessignificance at 5% level. See
estimates. See footnote 44 for the list ofTable 2
Equations Explaining Growth of Canadian Money Supply and its Components
Quarterly Data, 1970111 —19831
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Note: MS represents the average of the current and the lagged value of the money stock.
*indicates significance at 5%.See appendix for data and sources.
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Note: See Appendix for definitions